Why should NATO officials have to beg for more troops in Afghanistan?

Its members have a clear interest in supporting all necessary efforts to keep that country's former oppressors from swarming.

Unfortunately, NATO members have met only about 85 percent of their commitments in Afghanistan. Bear in mind that this is happening in the face of an upswing in the Taliban-led insurgency, producing some of the worst fighting NATO has seen since its inception.

NATO took over responsibility for the southern part of Afghanistan just a few months ago in an appropriate expansion of its role. But the Taliban and its allies have been waging fierce resistance that — to the surprise of NATO officials — goes beyond customary hit-and-run tactics. To meet the challenge of such a persistent and aggressive adversary, NATO needs more troops — and it needs them now.

That difficult situation points to much more than the importance of prevailing in the fight against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. NATO's performance there is tied to its overall record in the country, as well as its current and future out-of-Europe commitments, including interventions.

If NATO fails in Afghanistan, it will be greatly hampered moving forward. That must not happen. There is still time to shape Afghanistan into the sterling example of success in the war against terrorism that it should have become following the U.S.-led intervention.

Initially, the removal of the Taliban from power and its dispersal to the wind, along with its al-Qaida cohorts, sent a wave of relief over the surrounding region and the outside world. But then the war in Iraq materialized, and suddenly resources were being diverted on a large scale to an even bigger conflict.

The result was that Afghan-istan — which once was the U.S.-led intervention coalition's to lose — again beckoned as an opportunity for terrorists and their ilk. Emboldened by the growing distraction and demands of Iraq, they began to flex their muscles. What was once mainly a nuisance has developed into a formidable enemy.

More helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft would remedy the situation, as would more troops. How many? A reserve battalion of around 1,000, say some military officials. Others insist on double that amount. I would err on the side of caution and go with the higher number.

Dispatching more troops is only the first necessary step, though.

The second is to declare to the Taliban and their brethren in unequivocal terms that Afghan-istan is not up for grabs. They had their moment to lead, and they failed, running the country and its people into the ground. The world must vigorously deny them the predictably similar disastrous results a second chance would bring.

The third necessary step is to direct more foreign aid to Afghanistan on a proportional scale that would match the reconstruction zeal that happened in Germany and Japan after World War II. This is not the time for a halfhearted helping hand.

The result of that three-pronged offensive — military, political and economic — would return the momentum to the allies in Afghanistan. In such an environment, they would stand a far better chance of prevailing.

I want to see NATO succeed in Afghanistan, Iraq and in other places where its services are or will be needed. The alliance is the most robust and capable organization of the 21st century to handle interventions, peacemaking and other challenges.

However, it cannot continue to progress with backing that falls short of stated commitments. If anything, NATO members should be willing to exceed their promises in the interest of securing victory. Under no circumstances should NATO have to beg.

John C. Bersia, winner of the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing, is special assistant to the president for global perspectives and a professor at the University of Central Florida. He wrote this commentary for the Orlando Sentinal.