The new maritime strategy published last week is particularly pertinent to the evolving security posture of the United States in Asia and in the Pacific and Indian oceans where the nation's armed forces are being realigned to put less weight on ground forces and more on sea and air power.

In this strategy, deterrence is as important as war-fighting. "We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars," said the core document issued by the chief of naval operations, Adm. Gary Roughead; the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James T. Conway; and the commandant of the Coast Guard, Adm. Thad W. Allen. Roughead was formerly the Pacific Fleet commander here.

The leaders recognized the difficulty in preparing for war and undertaking other missions at the same time. "Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters," they said in the first unified strategy forged by the three services.

"Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors," the strategy said.

Moreover, the strategy calls for the three services to become equally adept at what is often termed "soft power," including humanitarian operations such as disaster relief. The leaders said their services "must become adept at forging international partnerships" with the maritime services of Asian nations.

Evidently responsive to the criticism that the U.S. acts unilaterally, the maritime strategy asserts: "No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain."

It adds, however: "Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered."

Although no nations were named, the strategy is intended to deter the emerging power of China and a potential threat from nuclear-armed North Korea. It is aimed at terrorists, pirates, and smugglers in Southeast Asia; a particular concern is the Malacca Strait through which pass 70,000 ships a year. And it seeks to reassure allies in Japan and Australia and to appeal to friends in Singapore, Indonesia and India.

The maritime strategy comes as the U.S. plans to reduce or withdraw ground forces from South Korea and to move almost half of the U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam, the island that is U.S. territory. In addition, long-range bombers and modern fighters are being posted to Guam, as are the latest versions of strategic reconnaissance aircraft.

At sea, the aircraft carrier George Washington, which is nuclear-powered, is scheduled to leave Norfolk, Va., next year to replace Kitty Hawk, the last of the Navy's conventionally powered carriers, in Japan. A sixth aircraft carrier will be added to the Pacific Fleet in 2010 when Carl Vinson is due to come out of overhaul; five will be in the Atlantic.

The Navy is assigning 60 percent of its attack submarines to the Pacific; three have already been forward deployed to Guam. Two guided missile submarines, converted from ballistic missile submarines and armed with 154 cruise missiles each, will be assigned to the Pacific.

Behind the newly published strategy is an unspoken motive — an effort by the sea services to stake out a position in the battle of the defense budget that has already erupted. The war in Iraq has consumed an estimated $600 billion and left the Army stretched thin and needing to be re-equipped.

At the same time, an independent report on the Air Force by a respected retired Army general, Barry McCaffrey, found that service to be short of money for the future. "It is too small, has inadequate numbers of aging aircraft, has been marginalized in the current strategic debate, and has mortgaged its modernization program to allow the diversion of funds to prosecute" the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now the Navy is navigating to get its share. This struggle will have a bureaucratic twist since the Coast Guard belongs to the Department of Homeland Security, not to the Department of Defense like the Navy and Marine Corps. That opens the question of which department will fund the Coast Guard if it is to be a full fledged participant in the new maritime strategy.

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. His column appears weekly in Sunday's Focus section.